## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

WILLIAMS & HAUPT, P.C.,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
v. CENTURY BANK, et al.,	)	CV420-160
	)	
	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

## **ORDER**

This matter was assigned to the undersigned. *See* docket. Because of a previous partnership relationship with a law firm which has newly appeared to represent a defendant, and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I recuse.

Two federal statutes govern judicial disqualification due to conflict of interests. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, only applies when "a party . . . makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit . . . ." Since no such affidavit has been filed, it does not apply here. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 455, "places a judge under a self-enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist." United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by J.W. by and through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 904 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018). Courts have

generally recognized that prior partnership in the law firm representing a party

is not an absolute bar on a judge's hearing a case. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369

F.3d 1270, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (prior partnership in law firm not grounds for

recusal); Apex Oil Co. v. Apex Oil, 981 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1992) (judge's prior

partnership in law firm that represented party involved in case was not

required to recuse); Ford v. Bank of Am., 2000 WL 1028238, \* 2 (10th Cir. July

26, 2000) (unpublished) (disqualification not required because of judge's prior

employment with law firm representing defendants). Nevertheless, judges

typically observe a two-year recusal period from cases involving their prior law

firms. Draper, 369 F.3d at 1281 (citing Guide to Judiciary Policies and

*Procedures*, Vol. II, Ch. V, Compendium § 3.3-1(b) (2003). It is vital that litigants

and the public see that the judicial process is fair and impartial. Accordingly, I

will exercise my discretionary power to recuse in this case.

The Clerk is, therefore, **DIRECTED** to forward a copy of this order to the

assigned District Judge for reassignment

**SO ORDERED**, this 14th day of August, 2020.

Christopher L. Ray

United States Magistrate Judge

Southern District of Georgia

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